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Introduction
Human rights are important. First and foremost they are relevant for
those fighting for respect for their own or others’ human rights and
for the improvement of situations in which fundamental rights are vio-
lated. But human rights are also of interest for politicians, political the-
orists, international lawyers, jurisprudents, NGO activists, civil servants,
and, of course, political and moral philosophers. Obviously, the interest
in human rights is stirred by quite different reasons: some of them pure-
ly practical, some of them purely theoretical, most of them combining
practical and theoretical concerns. Yet all those involved with human
rights should share one fundamental concern: to know what is the na-
ture of the subject they are talking about and in which way it has nor-
mative force. In other words, the clarification of the concept of human
rights and the justification of these rights – the two core challenges of
the contemporary philosophy of human rights – should matter to all
who are interested, in one way or another, in human rights.
In offering such clarification and justification political and moral
philosophy has something relevant to contribute to the general discus-
sion of human rights. Being philosophers, we might be criticized for
making such a strong claim as to the relevance of philosophy. But for-
giveness might be granted in light of our willingness to admit that phil-
osophical insights about human rights are not freestanding, nor do they,
in general, enjoy priority. Rather they depend in turn on the political,
juridical, etc. dimensions of the idea of human rights, that is, on the use
of the concept in practice.
The main function of universal human rights seems to be to set a
minimal standard for institutional and individual conduct on a global
scale and to guarantee human beings protection from mistreatment
through forms of universal legal rights. While an initial agreement
about human rights may cover this general claim, it is disputed how
to determine exactly the underlying moral idea of basic human rights
– and whether it is a moral idea at all that generates the normative
force of human rights. There are two primary ways to approach this
problem. Some argue that human rights, by their very nature, are
held by all human beings either simply because of their common hu-
manity, their human dignity, or because a set of basic needs and interests
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of all human beings is sufficiently important that their protection natu-
rally has the status of a fundamental moral right. Others argue that
human rights essentially perform a political function. According to
these philosophers, the concept of a human right is dependent upon
the concept of some political institution or other. In this vein, the vio-
lation of human rights is construed, e. g., as pro tanto justification for
outside interventions on an international level such that the defining
function of human rights is to set limits to state sovereignty.
In both cases – the moral and the political view – further questions
loom. Some of them are concerned with the nature of human rights as
rights. Can human rights be justified? If so, how? And what, if any-
thing, is special about human rights as rights?
Then again, with respect to human rights, it often remains under-
determined what the corresponding duties are. After all, it seems im-
plausible to grant someone a right without offering some idea about
how this right can be honored, that is to determine, who exactly shall
have which obligation to account for the right in question. On one po-
litical conception human rights only obligate official agents such as gov-
ernments or institutions. Others argue, however, that not only official
agents but also individual agents can be said to be holders of human
rights-corresponding duties. Following the debate about identifying
the holder of rights corresponding duties it becomes important to deter-
mine the exact content of these duties.
Human rights are often taken to be essentially universal. But how
can there be universal rights in view of the fact that there is such a va-
riety of different, often competing moralities in the world? Is it plausible
to assume that many moralities just get it wrong? Obviously, the ques-
tion of whether or not human rights are universal is not only important
from a philosophical point of view. It is also one of the most pressing
challenges to the politics of human rights when it comes to promoting
human rights as a standard of conduct in regions dominated by different
moral standards.
The articles collected in this volume examine in detail these important
and much disputed issues in the contemporary philosophical debate
about human rights: (I.) the clarification of the concept of human rights,
(II.) the analysis of human rights as rights along with the question of
rights-corresponding duties, and (III.) the universality of human rights.
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Moreover, the question of a justification of human rights is pertinent to
each of these issues.1
The first part of our volume is mainly concerned with the two con-
ceptions of human rights already mentioned: the moral and the political
conception of human rights. Our authors approach this issue from dif-
ferent angles.
In the first paper, “Human rights : questions of aim and approach”,
James Griffin does two things: He argues that to determine its approach
in a principled way, every theory of human rights needs to have a clear
aim, and he bases his own approach on the aim of giving more deter-
minateness to the concept of human rights as it figures in our on-
going public human rights discourse. The concept of human rights
must be better specified, according to Griffin, as a precondition for ra-
tional debate about existence conditions of human rights, the content of
particular human rights, and potential conflicts of rights. The theory this
aim leads to is characterized and defended as piecemeal (as opposed to
systematic like Kant’s, Mill’s or Wellman’s approach to human rights),
monist (not pluralist) concerning the basic values human rights are
grounded in, and evaluative (not functional, as e. g., the approaches of
Dworkin, Nozick, Rawls, Raz and Beitz). The basic evaluative concept
in Griffin’s approach is the concept of normative agency. But since Grif-
fin wants to determine a concept of human rights that meets the prac-
tical constraints of uptake (it should actually be used in public discourse)
and durability (it should be stable in this use) he also takes these “prac-
ticalities” into account.
In “On the nature of human rights” John Tasioulas sketches three
broad families of answers to the question of what is the essential nature
of a human right: (1) the Reductive View, according to which human
rights are best understood without essential reference to the notion of a
(moral) right, e. g. as universal human interests, (2) the Orthodox View,
according to which human rights are universal moral rights possessed by
all human beings simply in virtue of their humanity, and (3) the Political
View, which makes some political role, or set of roles, an essential aspect
of the nature of human rights. Tasioulas argues that a suitably interpret-
ed version of the Orthodox View is preferable to both of its rivals: un-
like the Reductive View, it is able to capture the distinctive moral sig-
nificance of human rights as normative standards, whereas unlike the
1 The following summaries are in many cases based on abstracts provided by the
authors.
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Political View it does not make the discourse of human rights beholden
to extraneous institutional considerations.
In opposition to the moral conception of human rights held by Grif-
fin, Tasioulas and others, different authors argue in favor of what is
sometimes called a political conception of human rights. They think
that the essence of human rights is determined by their having a specific
political function, e. g. to limit the sovereignty of states. This political
conception, it is often argued, is closer to the contemporary human
rights practice than the traditional view of human rights, and this is
seen as a reason to accept it. However, Peter Schaber argues in his
paper “Human rights without foundations” that the political view of
human rights should not be accepted. He attempts to show that this
conception does not pass the adequacy test that the political view itself
proposes for a satisfactory theory of human rights, nor does this view
give us the justification of human rights that is needed. Instead, Schaber
provides his own defense of a moral view of human rights in which the
concept of human dignity plays a pivotal role.
In “The moral and political conception of human rights – a mixed
account” Erasmus Mayr also focuses on the dispute between adherents of
the political and moral conceptions of human rights, which turns on the
question of whether human rights are essentially distinguished as such
by their specific political function. Some adherents of the political con-
ception, like Joseph Raz, combine the view that human rights have an
essentially political role with the claim that they are a sub-class of moral
rights. This, according to Mayr, makes a combination of both ap-
proaches appear attractive, where, so it seems, the political conception
of human rights answers the conceptual question of what human rights
essentially are, while the moral conception offers the most attractive an-
swer to the question of how human rights claims are justified. However,
Mayr argues that we cannot expect both conceptions to be capable of
the sort of “convergence” that this combination would require. Instead,
one should follow a moderate version of the political conception, re-
garding both the question of what distinguishes human rights from
other individual rights and the question how human right-claims can
be justified. It turns out, however, that this does not make human rights
dependent on the actual existence of states, and that a convincing polit-
ical account of human rights even requires that human rights are, by and
large, universal rights that human beings possess qua human beings – just
as the moral conception claims. The resulting account of human rights
which Mayr advocates can therefore aptly be called a “mixed” account.
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The second part of this volume focuses on issues related to the notion of
“rights” in the term “human rights”. Is it possible to justify rights on a
consequentialist basis? What’s special about human rights as rights?
What are the duties corresponding to human rights and what is their
scope?
Utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialism are frequently
criticized on grounds that the impersonal pursuit of maximum aggregate
goodness fails to provide adequate room for fair distributions and indi-
vidual rights. In his paper “Problems with some consequentialist argu-
ments for basic rights” Samuel Freeman examines three kinds of argu-
ments consequentialists have made for moral, human, or basic individual
rights that respond to these criticisms. First, there is the indirect conse-
quentialist framework provided by J.S. Mill ; second, there are distribu-
tion sensitive accounts of well-being and other goods; and third, there
are accounts that directly incorporate rights and other moral concepts
into the good that is to be maximized. In response to Mill, even grant-
ing he has shown that basic rights and liberties are necessary for individ-
ual well-being, Freeman argues that this does not warrant the conclu-
sion that equal rights and equal freedoms are always or even ever neces-
sary to maximizing the sum total of individual well-being. He thinks that
similar problems apply to the second position, which incorporates
equality of goods (of welfare, autonomy, etc.) or other distribution-sen-
sitive values into the consequentialist maximand (argued for by T.M
Scanlon, Larry Temkin, Bill Talbott, and Philip Pettit). According to
Freeman, equal distribution of one or more goods does not imply
equal rights of the kinds advocated by liberal and social democrats or
human rights advocates. Finally, the third position, best represented
by Amaryta Sen, argues that equal rights and fair distributions are them-
selves intrinsic goods to be promoted for their own sake. Freeman con-
tends that this position is not really consequentialist but rather is a plu-
ralist intuitionist conception that requires balancing aggregate goodness
against antecedent moral principles of fairness and individual rights.
Rowan Cruft’s essay “Human rights as rights” defends the thesis that
individualistic justification is one of the hallmarks of human rights.
Combining this conception of human rights with standard worries
about socioeconomic and other “expensive” rights can tempt one to
take the phrase “human rights” to refer to any individualistically justi-
fied weighty normative consideration – including considerations that
are not rights in Hohfeld’s sense. Cruft maintains that abandoning a
Hohfeldian conception of rights is problematic in several ways: for in-
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stance, it makes it difficult to distinguish rights from their grounding
values, and can make it unclear in what sense rights-violations genuinely
wrong right-holders. But the essay ends with the suggestion that – due
to the nature of individualistic justification – these problems are less
worrying for human rights than for other rights.
The aim of Corinna Mieth’s paper “On human rights and the
strength of corresponding duties” is to determine the strength of indi-
vidual duties corresponding to human rights. While Onora O’Neill
claimed that the existence of social human rights depends on the alloca-
tion of corresponding duties, Elizabeth Ashford holds that it is not the
existence but the realization of social human rights that depends on
their institutionalization. From this she concludes that there are individ-
ual duties to institutionalize human rights under non-ideal circumstan-
ces. Mieth focuses on the strength of these duties. She suggests a recon-
struction of the strength of duties according to three criteria. The first
criterion is the significance of the good that is protected by a right
and the corresponding duty. This leads to a differentiation of the
strength of duties according to the theory of goods that diverges from
the differentiation of negative and positive duties found in the theory
of action. Furthermore, Mieth defends the idea that reasonable demand-
ingness can be considered a second criterion for the strength of duties.
Thirdly, the specificity of the content of the duty has relevance for its
strength. If this is correct, then the duties of an average person to insti-
tutionalize human rights are only weak. Therefore, Mieth proposes a
shift from duties to responsibilities. Even if duties of institutionalization
are underdetermined in general and therefore only weak, it may be pos-
sible to assign responsibilities to improve human rights standards.
The last contribution to the second part of this volume also address-
es the question of the demandingness of rights-corresponding duties but
focuses on individuals as duty bearers. In his paper “The moral demand-
ingness of socioeconomic human rights”, Jan-Christoph Heilinger asks
whether excessive demands for moral agents speak against a moral
framework such as socioeconomic human rights. In other words, is an
account of human rights that embraces welfare rights unsound if it
turns out to be extremely burdensome for moral agents? After an anal-
ysis of the relationship between human rights and the corresponding,
potentially overdemanding duties, Heilinger argues that not only insti-
tutions but also individual agents are addressed by these duties. Next, he
introduces the “moral demandingness objection” as a meta-theoretical
criterion to judge the soundness of a moral theory and shows different
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ways in which a moral theory might demand more than agents can do
or can be reasonably expected to do, particularly in the context of
human rights. His paradigm case is the alleged human right to adequate
food and its corresponding duties. Heilinger argues that excessive de-
mands mirror the current circumstances of extreme but in principle pre-
ventable world poverty. Hence, extremely burdensome demands should
be taken neither as an argument against the moral theory of human wel-
fare rights nor as a pre-emptive exculpation of agents failing to live up to
the duties corresponding to these rights. However, obligations corre-
sponding to welfare rights are not the only type of obligations for
moral agents; therefore, they should not always and exclusively strive
to fulfill these obligations.
Whatever the nature of human rights might be, and whatever their sta-
tus as rights exactly involves, one feature seems to be essential in any
case: Human rights are universal rights. Nevertheless, anyone claiming
that human rights are universal is confronted with the fact that there are
quite different moralities to be found in the world – present and past.
So, are human rights really universal? Is there enough common ground
between all moralities for a justification of human rights? Do we even
need such a common ground? The papers of the third part of this vol-
ume try to answer questions like these.
In his paper “Common humanity as a justification for human rights
claims” Simon Hope argues for two related conclusions. His primary
concern is to investigate the standard justification for human rights in
the modern human rights culture: That human rights are held in virtue
of our common humanity. Hope argues that the depth and breadth of
moral diversity raises serious questions about whether the features of
common humanity standardly appealed to can stand as intelligible
moral reasons to the bearers of different forms of life. At the same
time, he does not think a retreat to a Rawlsian-inspired “political” con-
ception of human rights is justified. Ordinary moral reasoning does not
break down completely when addressed to an unbounded domain of
agents. Although necessarily constrained, ordinary moral reasoning
about the human condition can justify human rights claims. But that
reasoning must appeal to vulnerabilities inherent in the human condi-
tion, rather than features of personhood, if intelligible reasons are to
be advanced.
On the one hand, the universality of human rights is, as it seems,
part of their very nature. On the other hand, when we look at the mor-
Introduction XIII
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 21.11.17 11:25
alities actually endorsed by different persons/cultures etc., we find a
great variety, including quite different views on the nature and impor-
tance of human rights. From a philosophical point of view, there seem
to be two different options, one as unsatisfactory as the other: Either we
must assume that many people/cultures etc. are deeply wrong about
fundamental moral matters, or we have to admit that human rights
are not universal after all. In his paper “Human rights and moral diver-
sity” Gerhard Ernst tries to find a solution to this problem by outlining a
morally decent form of moral relativism. He is convinced that there is a
deeply contingent element in morality as such which allows for some
variation concerning a morally acceptable stance towards human rights.
The present volume presents new philosophical papers, written by lead-
ing philosophers in the field, inquiring into crucial aspects of the current
philosophical debate about human rights. It includes selected papers
from a workshop on the philosophy of human rights held in 2009 at
the Venice International University as well as invited papers. The Ven-
ice workshop was part of a project on human rights established by the
Junge Akademie and the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Hu-
manities. First and foremost we thank the authors for their contributions
to this volume. We also owe our gratitude for generous financial sup-
port to the Udo Keller Stiftung–Forum Humanum. Furthermore, spe-
cial thanks go to Erich Ammereller for pulling most of the weight in
organizing the workshop just mentioned, and to him, Konrad Petrovsz-
ky, Tobias Pulver, and Karsten Schoellner for their help in preparing
this volume.
Stuttgart and Zurich, August 2011 The editors
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